As the world expects the new US Administration to solve the perennial Arab-Israeli conflict, one cannot fail to notice a paradox. On the one hand, there is seemingly a broad consensus between Israel, the Palestinians and the international community about the “two-state solution.” On the other hand, this “solution” keeps working in theory and failing in practice. This book explains why. By meticulously analyzing the evolution of Israel’s foreign policy between the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the Oslo Agreements (1993), the book shows how Israel’s leaders, through a trial-and-error process as well as a constant tension between nationalism and realism, came to accept the two-state solution only to realize that the Palestinians’ “acceptance” of that solution was purely tactical, temporary, and insincere. The world can help bringing peace to the Middle East by recognizing that the “two-state solution” is fundamentally incompatible with the “right of return.” This book is a must-read for foreign policy decision-makers and for anyone interested in the future of the Middle-East.
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